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Why 'Fiscal Austerity'? A Review of Recent
Evidence on the Economic Effects of
Sovereign Debt
CATHERINE BONSER-NEAL*
ABSTRACT

Concerns about the economic effect of high sovereign debt levels have
motivated policy makers to constrain or reduce the growth of fiscal
deficits, a practice commonly known now as "fiscal austerity." However,
what do we know about the economic impacts of sovereign debt? This
article provides an overview of some recent empirical economic research
into this question. The article first discusses data and estimation
challenges confronted by empirical research into the impact of sovereign
debt on economic growth. The article then reviews several studies, which
vary by country sample, time period studied, and estimation technique
employed. The article also reviews recent empirical studies of the
economic consequences of sovereign default. The results of this article's
survey suggest that while the bulk of the evidence shows a negative
relationship between sovereign debt levels and economic growth, the
evidence to date is mixed on whether higher debt burdens cause or are
merely correlated with lower economic growth, and on whether there
exists a certain 'threshold' beyond which this negative relationship
arises. Only a few studies have provided evidence on the economic
mechanism through which higher debt burdens impact economic growth.
This review of the research does, however, reveal stronger evidence that
sovereign default episodes have negative impacts on an economy's
growth. The article concludes by raising some important questions to be
addressed if we are to better understand the economic impacts of debt.

* Associate Professor of Finance, Indiana University Kelley School of BusinessIndianapolis. I would like to thank the participants of the Indiana Journal of Global Legal
Studies Conference on Law and the Globalization of Austerity, held September 11-12,
2014 at the Maurer School of Law in Bloomington, IN, for their comments.
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INTRODUCTION

The growth of fiscal deficits and rising debt levels that countries
incurred during and following the 2007-2008 Global Financial Crisis
have sparked renewed debate among economists and policy makers over
the implications of increasing and high sovereign debt levels and the
appropriate policies to address such burdens. This debate focuses on the
levels at which debt adversely impacts an economy as well as the degree
to which any adverse impacts arise. A recent debate in the online
VoxEU forum nicely summarizes the two views. On the one hand, some
argue that:
[The] debate is not about the desirability of restoring
safer fiscal positions after the large increase in gross and
net public debt in the last few years. This can be safely
taken for granted. The question is whether governments
should relent in their efforts to reduce deficits now,
when the global economy is still weak, and policy
credibility is far from granted.1
On the other hand, others argue "[p]ublic debt ratios without
retrenchment would become unsustainable, even if 'this austerity'
2
implies a temporary loss of employment and output."
What risks do high sovereign debt levels imply for an economy, and
what is considered "high"? How do the answers to these questions vary
by time, country, and economic conditions? Such answers are important
to the intelligent implementation of policies that seek to slow or reverse
such trends. This article reviews some of the recent empirical research
on the economic impacts of sovereign debt. Following this introduction,
the article reviews some of the trends in sovereign debt, and discusses
theoretical links between sovereign debt and economic growth. The
article then discusses the empirical research relating debt and economic
growth and identifies some of the empirical challenges in measuring
this relationship. This review of the empirical research will also
examine the key question of whether a certain debt-to-gross domestic
product (GDP) "threshold" level exists beyond which debt ratios begin to
reduce economic growth. The article concludes with a discussion of
empirical studies that examine the consequences of sovereign default.
1. Giancarlo Corsetti, Has Austerity Gone Too Far?,VOX CEPR'S POL'Y PORTAL (Apr.
2, 2012), http://www.voxeu.orglarticle/has-austerity-gone-too-far-new-vox-debate.
2. Daniel Gros, Austerity is Unavoidable After a Bout of Profligacy, VOX CEPR's
POL'Y PORTAL (July 19, 2012), http://www.voxeu.org/article/austerity-unavoidable-afterbout-profligacy.

WHY 'FISCAL AUSTERITY'?
I. SOVEREIGN DEBT: AN OVERVIEW OF RECENT TRENDS AND THEORETICAL

PREDICTIONS
Before reviewing the empirical evidence on the relationship between
sovereign debt and economic growth, it is useful to understand the
evolution of sovereign debt. This section provides an overview of some
historical trends, and also discusses potential economic implications of
such trends.
A. Trends in Sovereign Debt
Until recently, postwar concerns over sovereign debt burdens were
focused on emerging market countries. Figure 1 shows how, historically,
public debt ratios in excess of 60 percent of GDP were common in
emerging market countries, but not in developed countries. 3 A sharp
rise in fiscal deficits in advanced countries during World War II
reversed these trends, with these countries' public debt ratios reaching
a high of nearly 90 percent before falling sharply. During the postWorld War II era, emerging market debt ratios once again rose above
advanced country debt ratios, reaching a peak during the banking and
financial crises of the 1980s and 1990s. Advanced country debt ratios
averaged less than 40 percent between 1950 and 2006.
The Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2008 changed the post-war
observation that sovereign debt burdens were largely the concern of
emerging market countries. As government balances deteriorated,
public debt-to-GDP ratios in advanced countries surpassed those of
emerging markets, rising to levels not seen since World War II. 4 Figure
2 illustrates these sharp declines in the overall government balances of
advanced countries during the recent recession. Moreover, Figure 3
shows the International Monetary Fund (IMF) projects this difference in
debt burdens to continue, with average public debt-to-GDP levels in
advanced countries expected to be 106 percent of GDP in 2015,
compared to an average of 41 percent of GDP in emerging and middleincome countries. 5 Among individual countries, debt ratios in Japan,
and the southern European countries impacted by the Euro Crisis, have
reached historically high debt levels, with Japan's gross public debt-to3. See infra Figure 1.
4. See Carmen M. Reinhart et al., Public Debt Overhangs: Advanced Economy
Episodes Since 1800, 26 J. ECON. PERSP. 69, fig.1; see also Int'l Monetary Fund [IMF],
World Economic Outlook: Coping with High Debt and Sluggish Growth, at fig.3.1 (Oct.
2012) (showing that debt levels in several advanced economies reached levels comparable
to the mid-1940s), available at http://www.imf.orgexternal/pubs/ftweo/2012/O2/pdf/text.pdf.
5. See infra Figures 2, 3.
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GDP expected to reach 245 percent in 2015.6 Figure 4 shows that the
gross government debt-to-GDP ratio in the United States has reached a
level not seen since the World War II decade. 7 Indeed, the U.S. federal
debt as a percentage of GDP has nearly doubled over its pre-2008
average. 8 The natural question facing policy makers and researchers is:
how do these increases in debt burdens, which have reached postwar
historic levels, impact an economy's growth?
B. What Does Theory Suggest about the Relationship between Debt and
Growth?
Public debt arises from the need by a government to finance a
budget deficit. Different theories of the output effects from a rise in
government spending-or the "fiscal multiplier,"-suggest values that
range from negative to greater than one, depending on the model and
assumptions applied. 9
Theories of the impact of sovereign debt, however, focus on how the
debt levels, which arise from the accumulation of such deficits, can
impact output and economic growth. As illustrated in recent surveys,
the range of model predictions for the economic impact of sovereign debt
is wide. 10 Models that demonstrate a negative effect of higher debt on
economic growth typically result from a decrease in investment.
6. See Int'l Monetary Fund, Fiscal Monitor: Back to Work-How Fiscal Policy Can
Help, at 1 tbl.l.2 (Oct. 2014), available at http://www.imf.org/externa/pubs/ft/fm/2014/02/
pdf/fm 1402.pdf [hereinafter Fiscal Monitor].
7. See infra Figure 4; see also Fiscal Monitor, supra note 6, at tbl.1.2 (showing that
the U.S. debt-to-GDP ratio increased from 2008 to 2013 and was projected to continue
increasing through 2015).
8. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE 2014 LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK 1, 5 (2014),
available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/45471-Long-TermBudgetOutlook_- 7-29.pdf.
9. For a concise overview of theories of the fiscal multiplier, see Menzie Chinn, Fiscal
Multipliers, in NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 1, 2-4 (Steven N. Durlauf &
Lawrence E. Blume, eds., 2013), available at http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/
downloadlpde2013_.F000329.pdf.
10. See Mark Aguiar & Manuel Amador, Sovereign Debt: A Review, in 4 HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 647, 649-683 (Gita Gopinath et al. eds., 2014) (surveying
literature on sovereign debt, with an emphasis on default); Douglas W. Elmendorf & N.
Gregory Mankiw, Government Debt, in 1C THE HANDBOOK OF MACROECONOMICS 1615,
1627-1659 (John B. Taylor & Michael Woodford eds., 1999) (discussing the conventional
view that government debt stimulates growth in the short term but reduces national
income in the long term, and comparing it to the theory of Ricardian equivalence that
government debt is irrelevant); Ugo Panizza & Andrea F. Presbitero, Public Debt and
Economic Growth in Advanced Economies: A Survey, 149 Swiss J. ECON. STAT. 175, 176193 (2013) (discussing an overview of literature that suggests debt negatively impacts
growth but that the impact is small, and arguing that no study has effectively established
a causal relationship between debt and negative growth).

WHY 'FISCAL AUSTERITY'?
According to this "conventional" view, a fall in public savings
(equivalent to a rise in the budget deficit) not matched by a rise in
private savings will reduce overall national savings. Since national
savings are required for investment to take place, a fall in savings will
then lead to a fall in investment and, hence, a fall in the country's
capital stock. 1' This effect, commonly known as the "crowding out
effect," implies that public debt is associated with lower economic
growth because a lower capital stock will imply a lower future output.
Of course, the extent to which government dissavings (or equivalently
by a rise in government debt) impacts private savings depends on a
number of factors, such as consumer preferences, the relevant time
horizon, the openness of the economy, the degree of uncertainty, and the
existence of tax effects. 12 Models that extend this simple framework by
adding a monetary sector and the assumption of rational expectations
capture additional negative economic effects of higher public debt
burdens including: the risk of hyperinflation if governments are unable
to finance existing debt, the impact of higher future taxes and
distortions from those taxes, the risk of a reduction in discipline in the
budget process, and, importantly, the risk of a crisis of confidence that
increases the likelihood that sovereign default becomes selfreinforcing. 13 In most cases, these models focus on the longer-term
implications of high levels of sovereign debt. More recent models,
however, suggest that the inflationary effects of debt could be present in
the short run.' 4 For example, if an expectation that today's real value of
11. See Elmendorf & Mankiw, supra note 10, at 1629. Elmendorf and Mankiw
illustrate this result using the national accounting equation: Sp + (T-G) = I + NFI, where
Sp is private savings, T-G is the government budget balance, I is private real capital
investment spending, and NFI is net foreign investment spending. If the sum Sp + (T-G)
falls, then it must be the case that I also falls, unless offset by a rise in NFI. Id.
12. See, e.g., Robert J. Barro, The RicardianApprach to Budget Deficits, 3 J. ECON.
PERSP. 37 (1989) (discussing these assumptions underlying this result). See also Valerie A.
Ramey, Can Government PurchasesStimulate the Economy?, 49 J. ECON. LITERATURE 673,
675 (2011) (reviewing some of the key theoretical differences between Neoclassical models
and Keynesian models as they pertain to the fiscal multiplier); Michael Woodford, Simple
Analytics of the Government Expenditure Multiplier, 3 AM. ECON. J.: MACROECONOMICS 1,
2 (2011) (discussing how assumptions regarding the type of taxes levied, the degree of
price flexibility, the degree of monetary accommodation of fiscal policy, and expectations
about future prices and monetary accommodation impact the size of the multiplier).
13. See Elmendorf & Mankiw, supra note 10, at 1630-32. For a more recent example of
models which emphasize how increases in debt negatively impact the economy through
increases in sovereign risk, see Giancarlo Corsetti et al., Sovereign Risk, Fiscal Policy and
Macroeconomic Stability (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 12/33, 2012), available
at http://www.imf.orgexternal/pubs/catllongres.aspx?sk=25681.0.
14. For examples of such models that allow for inflation to be impacted over the shortterm, see John H. Cochrane, Understanding Policy in the Great Recession: Some
UnpleasantFiscal Arithmetic, 55 EUR. ECON. REV. 2, 9 (2011) and Eric M. Leeper & Todd
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debt that exceeds the present value of future surpluses will cause a rise
in expected future inflation, then people will adjust their spending
behavior today.1 5 This adjustment in current spending will in turn drive
up the price level until the real value of debt equals the present value of
future budget surpluses, implying that inflation can rise today as a
16
result of expectations of future debt levels.
Other theories predict that debt will either have little to no impact
on the economy (i.e., debt is "neutral"), or that it will have a positive
effect. Models in which debt has minimal impact on the economy include
those in which consumers act in a "Ricardian" manner such that
consumers will offset the impact of a rise in public debt by increasing
their own savings, so that total national savings is unchanged. 17 Some
models show that it is also possible for an increase in public debt to
have a positive impact on growth if an economy is subject to imperfect
intermediation, whereby consumers cannot borrow as much or as
cheaply as they would like compared to the government. 8 Under these
conditions, additional government borrowing can actually increase
savings and investment because it leads to additional liquid assets,
thereby offering the private sector increased flexibility to respond to
economic shocks. The availability of these liquid assets, therefore,
enhances economic efficiency, which contributes to economic growth.
The theoretical predictions for the sign of the relationship between
debt and growth are dependent on the model, and, hence, on the validity
of assumptions about consumer behavior and the structure of the
economy. While such models can provide insights into the different
factors that may be influencing the debt-economic growth relationship,
ultimately, empirical studies are needed to provide information on
how-and under what conditions-increases in sovereign debt actually
impact economic growth.

B. Walker, Perceptions and Misperceptions of Fiscal Inflation, in FISCAL POLICY AFTER
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 255, 271-73 (Alberto Alesina & Francesco Giavazzi eds., 2013).
15. See Cochrane, supra note 14, at 18-19. Cochrane further shows that there is no
"magic" debt level or threshold that sparks this inflation, and that "even very large debt is
possible if people understand there is a plan to pay it off." Id. at 18.
16. See Cochrane, supra note 14, at 18.
17. See, e.g., Robert J. Barro, Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?, 82 J. POL. EcON.
1095 (1974) (discussing whether increased government debt should be considered an
increase in household wealth).
18. See Michael Woodford, Public Debt as Private Liquidity, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 382,
386 (1990).

WHY 'FIscAL AUSTERITY'?

II.

EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE IMPACTS OF SOVEREIGN DEBT ON

ECONOMIC GROWTH
Before specifying and testing any empirical model of the
relationship between sovereign debt and economic growth, several data
issues must first be addressed. In particular, how is public debt
measured? Should total (central plus regional and local), or simply
central government debt be examined? Should one define debt to be
total debt issued, whether held by the government or public, or should
the focus be on debt held only by the public? 19 Should the measure of
debt be calculated on a gross or a net basis? 20 If net debt is the preferred
measure, should it be calculated using the market or the face values of
government assets? Should debt be defined more broadly to include
estimates of future social security, military and civil service retirement
pensions, and other entitlement obligations? Finally, should the level of
debt, whichever measure is chosen, be adjusted to reflect market and
economic conditions such as inflation, changes in interest rates, and the
21
business cycle?
In most cases, data availability and a desire for data comparability
across countries and time periods guide the measure of debt used in
empirical studies. For example, studies have tended to focus on gross
total or central debt, rather than on net debt, as a result of concerns
with comparability in the calculation of the value of government assets
held across countries, or as a result of the lack of data on government
assets. 22 Public debt measures used in empirical studies also exclude the
estimation of future government liabilities, since such liability
estimates are not available for all countries. 23 As a result, the measure

19. Government debt held in Social Security and Medicare trust funds is an example of
government debt not held by the public.
20. Net government debt is gross public debt minus the government's financial assets.
Net debt is therefore a measure of what the government would owe after existing assets
are sold.
21. For the discussion of this problem, see Elmendorf & Mankiw, supra note 10, at
1620-21. They note that higher inflation reduces the real value of the debt, while the level
of interest rates influences the market value of existing debt (with the value of debt rising
in a period where interest rates are declining). Longer maturity debt is also more sensitive
to changes in interest rates than is short-term debt, a result known as the "duration" of a
bond.
22. See Panizza & Presbitero supra note 10, at 197 for a discussion of this issue. The
empirical papers referenced in the next sections use gross, rather than net, debt as a
measure of debt.
23. Data on public debt published by the International Monetary Fund, for example,
does not include future liabilities in its estimates of gross public debt; the International
Monetary Fund encourages countries to include such estimates as a line item in their
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of government obligations will be biased downward for some countries
with large future liabilities. 24 The public debt data used in empirical
studies are generally adjusted to reflect their market, rather than face,
values; however, these adjustments do require assumptions and
estimation in the cases where the debt is not publicly traded. 25 Finally,
the empirical studies surveyed in this article will differ according to
whether they use total or central government debt as their measure of a
country's debt burden. This choice is often dictated by the availability of
historical data. The fact, however, that the two measures of government
debt can imply very different debt-to-GDP levels means that empirical
tests dependent on particular debt threshold levels will be impacted by
the measure of debt employed.
A second empirical issue concerns the appropriateness of pooling
advanced country and developing country debt-economic growth
relationships given differences in economic structures. In particular,
developing countries tend to have lower debt levels than developed
26
countries, which is "consistent with the presence of credit constraints."
Further, these countries experience limitations on the ability to borrow
as a result of weaker institutions, the prospects of larger financial
shocks, and riskier debt structures.21 Failure to adjust for such
differences in economic structure could lead to incorrect inferences
regarding the relationship between debt and growth. As a result, many
of the cross-country studies discussed below separate the effects across
the two types of country groups, or they include control variables to
estimate the relative impact of each country group.
With the above data issues in mind, this section reviews empirical
studies of the relationship between sovereign debt and economic growth.
First, this section reviews descriptive studies of the empirical
correlations between debt and economic growth across countries and
time. Next, it discusses the potential for two-way causality between debt
and growth, and examines studies that attempt to correct for any
empirical biases that arise from this causality. The section concludes
with a summary of empirical investigations into the mechanisms
through which higher debt levels could impact economic growth.

data. INT'L MONETARY FUND, PUBLIC SECTOR DEBT STATISTICS: GUIDE FOR COMPILERS

AND USERS 4 (2nd ed. 2013), availableat http://www.tffs.org/pdf/method/2013/psds2Ol3.pdf.
24. For a discussion of the importance of accounting for future liabilities, see id. at 4.
25. For a discussion of how the International Monetary Fund adjusts its public debt
statistics to reflect market values, see supranote 23, at 25.
26. LEE C. BUCHHEIT ET AL., COMM. ON INT'L ECON. POL'Y & REFORM, REVISITING
SOVEREIGN BANKRUPTCY 9 (2013), available at http://www.brookings.edu/research
reports2013/10/sovereign-debt.
27. Id. at 9.

WHY 'FiSCAL AUSTERITY'?
A. DescriptiveEstimates of the Relationship between Sovereign Debt
and Economic Growth
Early attempts to examine the relationship between sovereign debt
and economic growth focused on descriptive statistics of sovereign debtto-GDP ratios and rates of economic growth across time. In one of the
first studies of this kind, Reinhart and Rogoff constructed an extensive
historical database of financial crises around the world and the
economic factors that may be associated with such crises, including
government debt levels. 28 Building on this early work, Reinhart and
Rogoffs 2010 study examined the correlation between output growth
and debt for twenty advanced economies over the postwar period, 19462009, and also over the longer period of 1800-2009 when such data is
available. 29 To test for the impact of different threshold levels of debt,
the autLirs split the sample into four categories of (central) government
debt-to-GDP percentage ratios (0-30, 30-60, 60-90, >90) and examined
real GDP growth rates of the countries falling in those quartiles. Their
results indicated that the highest quartile of debt-to-GDP ratio was
associated with lower average and median real GDP growth rates over
the period in which such debt occurs. When examining this relation over
longer periods for a sample of developed countries, a similar conclusion
emerged.3 0 For emerging market countries, the negative relationship
between growth and debt levels occurred within two thresholds for
emerging countries: when the debt-to-GDP ratio was in the 60-90
percent category, both the average and the median growth rates were
lower. Growth was even lower when debt exceeded 90 percent of real
GDP.31 Though there was considerable variation in the degree to which
growth was lower across countries, the result was nevertheless striking
in its implications for how debt can have detrimental impacts on the
long-term output of countries.
Published during the time of rising developed country deficits and
debt, this article's results sparked renewed policy discussions about the
dangers of high public debt burdens and provided support for policies of
fiscal consolidation or "austerity" to reduce this burden. Researchers
who uncovered a coding error and questioned the weighting
28. See generally CARMEN M. REINHART

&

KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS

DIFFERENT: EIGHT CENTURIES OF FINANcIAL FOLLY (2009) (discussing a quantitative

history of financial crises in their various forms). The authors noted that "[a]lthough
private debt certainly plays a key role in many crises, government debt is far more often
the unifying problem across the wide range of financial crises we examine." Id. at xxxiii.
29. See Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, Growth in a Time of Debt, 100 AM.
ECON. REV. 573, 575 fig.2 (2010).
30. Id. at 575.
31. Id. at 576.
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methodology used to calculate average and median growth results
32
challenged some of the Reinhardt and Rogoff conclusions, however.
After correcting the coding error and recalculating the statistics, the
researchers found the drop in GDP growth above the 90 percent debt-toGDP threshold to be much less than what the Reinhart and Rogoff
(2010) paper had originally reported, though real GDP growth still
remained below the rate that was observed at lower debt-to-GDP
thresholds. 33 They also suggested the Reinhart and Rogoff results were
sensitive to the time period used for the estimation.3 4 While
acknowledging the data coding error, Reinhart and Rogoff maintained
that their broad conclusions, indicating that higher debt-to-GDP levels
35
are associated with lower economic growth, remained unchanged.
B. The Potentialfor Endogeneity Bias
Interest in the implications of sovereign debt sparked a number of
researchers to further explore and refine the estimation of the empirical
link between sovereign debt and economic growth. 36 One important
limitation of early descriptive studies was the recognition that there
may be bidirectional causality between sovereign debt and economic
growth. In particular, do higher debt-to-GDP levels reduce economic
growth via some of the channels suggested by theory, or do negative
shocks to real GDP growth combine with rising fiscal deficits during a
recession to raise the debt-to-GDP ratio, or do both occur? The potential
for this bidirectional causality, also known as an "econometric

32. See, e.g., Thomas Herndon et al., Does High Public Debt Consistently Stifle
Economic Growth? A Critique of Reinhartand Rogoff, 38 CAMBRIDGE J. EcON. 257, 263-66
(2014). In particular, they argue that since some countries have multiple episodes, the
weighting is not balanced across countries and provides a misleading representation of the
debt-growth correlation. Id.
33. Id. at 269 tbl.5.
34. Id. at 271 tbl.7.
35. Carmen Reinhart & Kenneth Rogoff, Reinhart,RogoffAdmit Excel Mistake, Rebut
Other Critiques, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 17, 2013, 7:56 AM), http:/Iblogs.wsj.com/economics/
and
Reinhart
2013/04/17/reinhart-rogoff-admit-excel-mistake-rebut-other-critiques/.
Rogoff also note that some of the data used in Herndon et al., supra note 28, was not
available at the time of the writing of their original paper, but that the more recent data
was incorporated into their later paper. Id. For the authors' later study that incorporates
the more recent data, see Reinhart, supra note 4 (using more recent data to examine "the
growth and interest rates associated with prolonged periods of exceptionally high public
debt.").
36. See generally Markus Eberhardt & Andrea F. Presbitero, This Time They are
Different: Heterogeneity and Nonlinearity in the Relationship Between Debt and Growth
(Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 13/248, 2013) and Panizza & Presbitero, supra
note 10, for a summary of some of these papers.

WHY 'FISCAL AUSTERITY'?

endogeneity bias," can be illustrated within a simple Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) framework in which Debt (D) and Growth (G) are
functions of each other. 37 Specifically, in the regression,
1) G=a+bD+u,
the coefficient "b" which measures the impact of debt on economic
growth will be biased downward if debt is also a function of growth, as
in
2)

D=m+kG+v,

and if k< 0.
In an attempt to address causality concerns that temporary
recessions increased the debt burden, Reinhart, Reinhart, and Rogoffs
2012 study refined their earlier results by examining "debt overhangs,"
or situations where the gross central government debt-to-GDP exceeded
90 percent for five years or more, in twenty-two developed countries,
with data for some countries going back to 1800.38 They identified
twenty-six cases of "debt overhangs" that met their definition, with
many of the cases of gross public debt exceeding 90 percent associated
with the costs of war. 39 They found that the "vast majority of high debt
episodes-twenty-three out of twenty-six-coincided with substantially
slower growth."40 This impact of debt beyond a certain level, also known
as a "threshold" effect has been documented in other descriptive
analyses. For example, in its October 2012 World Economic Outlook
report, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) found that "countries
that crossed the 100 percent threshold typically experienced lower GDP
growth than the advanced economy average." 4' The report also noted
that economic growth was higher for countries that had decreasing debt
burdens for each threshold, and the result was particularly strong for
42
the 90-115 percent debt-to-GDP threshold.
While these results are striking, persistence in both debt levels and
growth imply that these descriptive threshold studies remain

37. Ugo Panizza & Andrea F. Presbitero, Public Debt and Economic Growth: Is There a
Causal Effect?, 41 J. MACROECONOMIcs 21, 22 (2014) [hereinafter Panizza & Presbitero,
Causal Effect].
38. See Reinhart et al., supra note 4, at 78 tbl.2, for a commentary on specific country
episodes of debt overhang.
39. Id. at 77.
40. Id. at 70.
41. See IMF, supranote 4, at 108.
42. Id.
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susceptible to the endogeneity problem mentioned above: that is,
disentangling the direction of causality between debt and growth may
be difficult, especially during periods of sustained recession or low
growth.43 Furthermore, it is possible that there is no direct link between
debt and growth, but rather a third factor (e.g., a banking crisis) that is
driving both.
More sophisticated econometric techniques have, therefore, been
employed in an attempt to determine the direction of causality, as well
as to control for and identify possible "third factors" which may in fact
be driving some of these descriptive empirical results. These
econometric refinements can be grouped into four types. 44 First,
researchers have attempted to isolate the predictive effect of debt-toGDP ratios on economic growth via regressions of future real GDP
growth rates on past debt-to-GDP levels4 5 Second, studies have tried to
isolate or control for "fixed effects" of countries (to control for country
factors that are unchanged over time but may be influencing the
empirical results) or time periods (to control for similarities across
countries in a given year which are impacting the results). Researchers
have also used fixed effect models to attempt to control for factors such
as demographics, the level of financial development, the existence of
banking crises, the level of savings, and the openness of the country to
trade that may impact the estimation of the debt-economic growth
relationship. 46 Third, several papers have tested whether the
relationship between debt-to-GDP and growth is nonlinear, so that only
debt levels above a certain amount or threshold have an impact on
growth, and some of these papers have estimated, rather than specified,
these threshold levels.4 7 Finally, studies have used econometric methods
such as instrumental variable techniques to control for endogeneity and
48
the simultaneous nature of the relationship between debt and growth.
43. See Reinhart et al., supranote 4, at 80.
44. See Panizza & Presbitero, supra note 10, at 182-192 (reviewing econometric
modifications to early empirical studies, focusing on controls for covariates of debt and
growth, endogeneity, and nonlinearity).
45. See, e.g., Stephen G. Cecchetti, M.S. Mohanty & Fabrizio Zampolli, The Real Effects
of Debt 10 (Bank for Int'l Settlements, Working Paper No. 352, 2011); Manmohan S.
Kumar & Jaejoon Woo, Public Debt and Growth 1, 10 (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working
Paper No. 10/174, 2010).
46. See, e.g., Panizza & Presbitero, Causal Effect, supra note 37, at 36; Cristina
Checherita-Westphal & Philipp Rother, The Impact of High Government Debt on Economic
Growth and its Channels: An Empirical Investigation for the Euro Area, 56 EuR. ECON.
REV. 1392, 1395 (2012); Cecchetti et al., supranote 45, at 14.
47. See, e.g., Cecchetti et al., supra note 45, at 16; Eberhardt & Presbitero, supra note
36.
48. Instrumental variables estimation involves using a variable, or an "instrument,"
which is correlated with the independent explanatory variable which suffers from the
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The results of studies that incorporate these methods are discussed
below.
C. A Summary of EmpiricalResults
The characteristics and results of recent empirical studies of the
relation between debt levels and economic growth can be broadly
distinguished from each other along four dimensions: (1) the countries
and type of debt examined, (2) the existence of a "threshold effect" and
how it is estimated, (3) the examined time horizon of the relationship
between debt and growth (short-term, medium-term, or long-term), and
(4) the extent to which methods to address the endogeneity and
simultaneity problem in the estimation are used. 49 Such differences in
the samples, the years covered, and the methodologies employed have
led to varied conclusions on the debt-growth relationship, as shown
below.50
1. Empirical Support for a Negative Impact of Debt on Economic
Growth
Several empirical studies that have found support for the hypothesis
that higher debt-to-GDP levels tend to reduce economic growth,
especially above thresholds of around 90 percent. 51 Using data on
general government debt for eighteen OECD countries over the period
from 1980 to 2010, joint authors Cecchetti, Mohanty, and Zampolli
found that, even after controlling for endogeneity and other influences
on growth, "a 10 percentage point increase in the ratio of public debt-toGDP was associated with a 17-18 basis point reduction in the
endogeneity bias, but which is not impacted by the dependent variable. Commonly used
instrumental variables techniques include Two-Stage Least Squares, and Generalized
Method of Moments (GMM). See Checherita-Westphal & Rother, supra note 46, at 1397
tbl.3, for an example of this method applied to the debt-to-GDP estimation.
49. Eberhardt & Presbitero, supranote 36, at 5.
50. See id. at 44, tbl.A1, for a categorization of the empirical literature according to the
method, sample, and results. A summary of empirical results is also provided in Panizza &
Presbitero, CausalEffect, supra note 37, at 22.
51. See Deniz Baglan & Emre Yoldas, Government Debt and Macroeconomic Activity: A
Predictive Analysis for Advanced Economies 7 (Fed. Reserve Bd., Div. of Research &
Statistics & Monetary Affairs, Fin. And Econ. Discussion Series, Working Paper No. 201305, 2013); Anja Baum et al., Debt and Growth: New Evidence for the Euro Area, 32 J. INT'L
MONEY & FIN. 809, 820 (2013); Mehmet Caner et al., Finding the Tipping Point: When
Sovereign Debt Turns Bad, in SOVEREIGN DEBT AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: WILL THIS
TIME BE DIFFERENT? 63, 73 (Carlos A. Primo Braga & Gallina Vincelette eds., 2010);
Cecchetti et al., supra note 45; Checherita-Westphal & Rother, supra note 46; Eberhardt
& Presbitero, supra note 36, at 5; Kumar & Woo, supra note 45.
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subsequent average annual growth."5 2 They found further support for
their hypothesis that growth improves with low levels of debt, and that
higher debt-to-GDP levels in the top quartile were associated with lower
future real GDP growth rates. The debt thresholds used in the tests
were specified by the researchers, however, rather than estimated from
the data itself.
Joint authors Baglan and Yoldas also examined the relationship
between central government debt and growth in twenty advanced
OECD countries, using the 1954-2008 portion of the data used in
Reinhart and Rogoff s 2010 original paper. They attempted to correct for
the potential endogeneity bias using a fixed-effects panel regression
technique combined with a recursive demeaning procedure. 53 In
addition, rather than specify arbitrary threshold levels, these authors
used techniques that allowed them to test for and estimate threshold
effects in the debt-to-GDP empirical relationship. When the country
data for all debt levels were pooled together, their results failed to
demonstrate a statistically significant relationship between debt and
economic growth. 54 However, when the sample was split into two groups
based on their average debt-to-GDP ratios, the authors found a low
threshold (18 percent debt-to-GDP ratio) for low-debt countries, beyond
which growth tended to fall. 55 For the high debt-to-GDP country group,
they found that "for a 10 percentage point increase in the debt-to-GDP
ratio, annual output growth slows between 2 and 48 basis points per
56
year."
In contrast to studies that focus on a sample of OECD countries,
Checherita-Westphal and Rother's 2012 study focused on estimating the
relationship between general gross government debt levels and
economic growth in twelve Eurozone countries over the 1970-2008
period. The authors argued that their data on debt and GDP were all
measured in a consistent manner, and, hence, were more homogeneous
in measurements than other studies that use OECD data. 57 In addition,
they believed their focus on Eurozone debt-to-GDP relationships
contained relevant information helpful to understanding the recent

52. Cecchetti et al., supra note 45, at 14. The sample used in their paper also differs
from that used in Reinhart & Rogoff, supra note 29, in that it uses general (rather than
central) government debt over a shorter period, 1980-2010. In addition, the growth
equation uses overlapping five-year averages of the per capita income growth rate as a
way to reduce the impact of cyclical movements. Id. at 9.
53. Baglan & Yoldas, supra note 51, at 2.
54. Id. at 6.
55. Id. at 7.

56. Id. at 7.
57. See Checherita-Westphal & Rother, supra note 46, at 1394.
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Eurozone Crisis.58 In an attempt to correct for the possible endogeneity
bias, the authors estimated the impact of debt-to-GDP on real GDP
growth one and also five years ahead. 59 They also employed nonlinear
and instrumental variable techniques. They found debt levels above 90100 percent of GDP to be associated with lower economic growth, but
that the errors around this threshold suggested negative growth effects
could be present at a lower 70 percent threshold. These conclusions are
consistent with the results of earlier studies that focused on OECD
countries. Baum, Chechertia-Westphal, and Rother's 2013 study
considered further refinements to the methods used to determine the
appropriate threshold levels, and also examined the short-term (one
year) impact of general government debt-to-GDP on real GDP growth in
the twelve Euro Area countries over the 1990-2011 period. 6o They
solved for a debt threshold and found that debt was associated with a
positive impact on one-year-ahead economic growth below the threshold,
consistent with a short-term positive effect of deficit spending on GDP.
However, this economic impact fell toward zero as the debt level
approached the debt threshold, and the effect became negative for
countries with high debt-to-GDP levels above the estimated threshold. 61
The studies discussed above, all of which have incorporated more
precise econometric techniques, have focused on developed countries.
Additional studies have conducted similar tests over a broader sample
of developed and developing countries to determine the sign of the debtgrowth relationship. 62 Joint authors Kumar and Woo, for example,
examined a broader panel of thirty-eight developed and emerging
market countries between 1970 and 2007.63 Using a variety of
estimation methods to address biases that arise from endogeneity and
threshold concerns, and controlling for other economic influences, they
found that higher gross general government debt was associated with
lower future economic growth. 64 In addition, Kumar and Woo found

58. See id. at 1395. The twelve Euro countries include the original eleven members
plus Greece, using the European Commission's AMECO database of as of 2009. The
authors claim that an advantage of their sample is that the debt and growth data are
more homogeneous due to the application of common methodology in the construction of
the government debt and GDP numbers.
59. See id. at 1395.
60. Baum et al., supra note 51, at 812-13.
61. See id. at 815 tbl.2. They obtain two estimates of the threshold beyond which
higher debt reduces growth: the nondynamic model suggests a threshold of 72% of GDP,
while the "dynamic" threshold model yields a threshold of 95% when estimated over the
1990-2010 period.
62. See, e.g., Caner et al., supranote 51, at 64; Kumar & Woo, supranote 45, at 4.
63. Kumar & Woo, supra note 45, at 8.
64. Id. at 13.
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evidence of a negative threshold effect above 90 percent debt levels, a
65
result consistent with the original Reinhart and Rogoff article.
Caner, Grennes, and Koehler-Geib's 2011 study examined the
relation between gross general government debt in a broader group of
seventy-five developing and twenty-six developed countries over the
1980-2008 period. 66 They also employed econometric techniques to
estimate thresholds, and they found support for a threshold effect of
around 77 percent for the entire sample, along with a somewhat lower
threshold of 64 percent for the developing countries.67 As the debt-toGDP ratio exceeded those levels, economic growth was reduced.
However, they did not explicitly control for the endogeneity bias, instead
relying on the inclusion of the initial 1980 debt-to-GDP level as a partial
control for the long-term impact of growth on debt.
Finally, Eberhardt and Presbitero's 2013 study revisited the issue of
nonlinearity and thresholds in the relation between debt and growth by
seeking to determine if differences across country patterns impact the
results. 68 They noted that even if higher debt-to-GDP negatively
impacts growth, this growth effect will differ across countries according
to the reasons underlying the accumulation of such debt (e.g., borrowing
for investment or nonproductive spending), and the economic conditions
and level of development of the country. 69 As a result, they tested for
within-country threshold effects, in contrast to a single threshold effect
for all countries. Their paper also took into account time series issues
that arise from the longer-term relationship between debt and economic
growth using an error correction model that distinguishes between
these shorter- and longer-term effects. Using a sample of gross general
government debt on 105 developed and emerging countries from 1972 to
2009, they found evidence that countries with higher debt-to-GDP ratios
have lower economic growth over the longer run, though they failed to
find a specific debt threshold for that relationship. 70 Further, they found
that the debt-growth coefficients differ across countries, suggesting that
panel data estimation that aggregates these country effects into a single
71
coefficient ignores the diversity of the country results.
The studies discussed above, though differing in country sample,
econometric technique, and strength of the relationship between debt
65. Id. at 18.
66. Caner et al., supra note 51, at 64.
67. Id. at 73.
68. Eberhardt & Presbitero, supra note 36, at 5.
69. Id. at 8.
70. Id. at 20.
71. Id. at 25 ('The commonly found 90% debt threshold is likely to be the outcome of
empirical misspecification-a pooled instead of heterogeneous model-and subsequently a
misinterpretation of the results").
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and growth, are broadly supportive of the existence of a negative effect
of high debt levels on future economic growth. Other studies, which
have employed different adjustments for the endogeneity bias or
different estimations of the debt threshold levels, however, have
72
attained results that cast doubt on the robustness of this relationship.
These alternative results are discussed below.
2. Evidence Questioning the Robustness of the Debt-Growth
Relationship
Using data on central government debt from 1790 to 2009 as well as
OECD data on general government debt from 1960 to 2009, Egert's 2013
study estimated several threshold models to determine whether an
identifiable threshold for a negative relation between debt and economic
growth exists. 73 While he found a negative relationship between central
government debt and growth over the 1790-2009 period, the results
revealed imprecision in the estimation of the number and the
magnitude of the thresholds.7 4 In addition, the endogenously
determined debt-to-GDP threshold varied between 20-50 percent,
depending on whether central or general government debt was used,
and there was significant heterogeneity in the threshold levels across
countries.7 5 Hence, while the study provided support for a negative
relation between debt and growth, the estimation of the precise
threshold for when this negative relationship appears was subject to
considerable uncertainty.
Pescatori, Sandri, and Simon in their 2014 study estimated the
empirical relationship between debt levels and economic growth over a
longer term by testing for the impact of gross general government debtto-GDP levels that exceed a range of thresholds on real GDP growth
five, ten, and fifteen years later.7 6 This research differs from earlier
studies by focusing on the predictive effect of debt-to-GDP levels above a
number of thresholds on medium to longer-term future growth, rather
than on contemporaneous and near-term economic growth. Using a new
IMF data set of developed countries in which they allowed each country

72. See Balizs tgert, The 90% Public Debt Threshold: The Rise and Fall of a Stylised
Fact (OECD Econ. Dep't., Working Paper No. 1055, 2013); Andrea Pescatori et al., Debt
and Growth: Is There a Magic Threshold? (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 14/34,
2014); Tito Cordella et al., Debt Overhang or Debt Irrelevance?, 57 INT'L MONETARY FUND
STAFF PAPERS 1 (2010); Panizza & Presbitero, Causal Effect, supra note 37, at 23.
73. Egert, supra note 72, at 12.
74. Id. at 13.
75. Id. at 18.
76. See Pescatori et al., supranote 72.
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to have multiple, but not overlapping, episodes, they failed to find
evidence of a strong negative impact on growth over the medium term,
and they did not find evidence supportive of a particular threshold at
which debt has a negative influence. 77 The authors did, however, find
some evidence that countries with high and increasing debt burdens
faced lower growth and greater output variability than countries with
high but decreasing debt burdens, and they concluded that the
78
trajectory of the debt burden may matter more than the level itself.
Finally, joint authors Cordella, Ricci, and Ruiz-Arranz and joint
authors Panizza and Presbitero both explored whether other factors
that might influence both debt and economic growth may be behind the
seventy-nine
Examining
relationship. 79
observed
debt-to-GDP
developing countries over the 1970-2002 period, Cordella, Ricci, and
Ruiz-Arranz estimated the extent to which country characteristics, in
particular the quantity and quality of the investment, and the "quality"
of institutions (defined using the CPIA, or Country Policy and
Institutional Assessment, of the World Bank), were the source of the
empirical debt-growth relationship.8 0 If high debt levels reduce the
levels of investment or if they reduce the quality of the investment in
the country, then lower economic growth will tend to follow. 8 1 They used
techniques to control for any endogeneity bias and found that
developing countries with "good" policies and institutions were more
likely to be sensitive to the accumulation of debt above certain levels,
while countries with "poor" policies and institutions demonstrated little
relationship between debt and growth. Further, they found that the
negative impact of debt on growth in countries with good policies
occurred at thresholds of between 20-80 percent of GDP.82 Beyond the
80 percent level, debt appeared to become irrelevant as a factor for
determining growth.8 3 In countries with "poor policies and institutions,"
however, the negative effect of debt on growth disappeared beyond the
15 percent debt-to-GDP level.8 4 Their results suggested that the amount
of debt does not alter the economic growth trajectory for countries with
poor institutions and investment prospects.
In their 2014 paper, Panizza and Presbitero argued that earlier
studies did not adequately control for the endogeneity problem because
77.
78.
79.
37.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 9.
Id. at 10.
See Cordella et al., supra note 72; Panizza & Presbitero, Causal Effect, supra note
See Cordella et al., supra note 72, at 5.
See, e.g., id. at 6.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 12.
Id.
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the instruments used were likely to be poor substitutes for the influence
of debt and may also be highly persistent.8 5 Using an instrumental
variables approach and a new instrument for public debt, they failed to
find a negative effect of debt on economic growth for a sample of OECD
countries over the 1980-2009 period.8 6 Furthermore, they found no
evidence supporting the existence of a threshold effect. However, they
noted that while they did not find evidence of a negative relationship
between debt and growth, this lack of evidence did not imply "countries
can sustain any level of debt .... [T]he effect of debt may depend on how
87
it is accumulated, on its composition, and on its structure."
Overall, the empirical evidence suggests that the strength of the
relationship between sovereign debt-to-GDP levels and economic growth
is mixed, with comparisons made more difficult by differences in time
periods and country samples studied, in debt measured, and in the
empirical methods employed. While the bulk of the evidence supports
some negative relationship between debt levels and future longer-term
economic growth, the strength and magnitude of this relationship varies
across time and country sample, and the evidence fails to support a
single threshold level beyond which higher debt burdens become
detrimental to economic growth.
3. How Can Debt Impact Growth?
Given the mixed results on the empirical effect of public debt on
economic growth, research has recently focused on examining the
mechanism, rather than on just the pairwise relationship, for
determining how sovereign debt levels can impact economic growth.
These studies have focused on whether higher public debt levels impact
expectations of default, interest rates, factor productivity, or the "fiscal
multiplier." For example, joint authors Aguiar and Amador showed that
political "impatience" or the preference for spending now versus later,
plus perceptions that the government will default and expropriate
88
capital, can reduce investment spending, which then reduces growth.
Joint authors Broner, Erce, Martin, and Ventura proposed a model in
which high levels of sovereign debt in the presence of creditor
discrimination and financial frictions can lead to the displacement of
private debt by public debt (also commonly known as "crowding out"),

85.
86.
87.
88.

See Panizza & Presbitero, supranote 37, at 23.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 37.
See Aguiar & Amador, supra note 10, at 16.
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which in turn reduces economic growth.8 9 In their model, preferential
treatment was given to domestic over foreign creditors of sovereign debt,
which in turn lead to higher expected returns to domestic creditors, and
as a result to the higher cost of borrowing for investment. 90 Baum,
Checherita-Westphal, and Rother's 2013 study looked further at the
economic impacts of higher debt by examining how debt affects
estimates of the long-term real interest rate. 91 They found a positive
impact, further supporting the "crowding out" hypothesis that higher
debt could be affecting growth through the costs of borrowing for
investment purposes. 92 Finally, joint authors Kumar and Woo and joint
authors Checherita-Westphal and Rother both estimated the impact of
debt on total factor productivity. 93 They found evidence that higher
debt-to-GDP levels negatively impact total factor productivity, a result
consistent with how debt could negatively impact the economy.
Another mechanism through which the level of debt can negatively
impact the economy is through its influence on the size of a country's
fiscal "multiplier." In particular, if concern about high debt levels
encourages greater private savings, then the fiscal multiplier of any
government spending stimulus will be reduced. While a thorough
discussion of factors affecting the fiscal multiplier is beyond the scope of
this article, recent evidence does suggest that higher debt has reduced
94
fiscal multipliers significantly.
Together, these results are consistent with the evidence that shows
a negative impact of higher sovereign debt levels on economic growth.
However, additional research is needed to determine the means through

89. See Fernando Broner et al., Sovereign Debt Markets in Turbulent Times: Creditor
Discriminationand Crowding-Out Effects, 61 J. MONETARY ECON. 114 (2014).
90. Id. at 116. But see Mark L.J. Wright, Comment on "Sovereign Debt Markets in
Turbulent Times: Creditor Discrimination and Crowding-Out Effects" by Broner, Erce,
Martin and Ventura, 61 J. MONETARY ECON. 143 (2014) (noting that the decreases in
output observed in Europe may not be the result of a fall in the capital services, as one
would expect if the crowding out hypothesis were to explain the fall in output. Rather,
simply growth accounting categorizations suggest that most of the decrease in output
appears to be associated with decreases in labor services and in total factor productivity).
91. See Baum et al., supra note 51.
92. Id. at 819.
93. See Checherita-Westphal & Rother, supra note 46, at 1403; Kumar & Woo, supra
note 45, at 19.
94. See, e.g., Ethan Ilzetzki et al., How Big (Small?) Are Fiscal Multipliers?, 60 J.
MONETARY ECON. 239 (examining quarterly data on forty-four countries over the
1960-2007 period and finding evidence that fiscal multipliers in high-debt countries (debt
greater than 60% of GDP) are actually negative over the longer-run); Christiane Nickel &
Andreas Tudyka, Fiscal Stimulus in Times of High Debt: Reconsidering Multipliers and
Twin Deficits (European Cent. Bank, Working Paper Series No. 1513, 2013) (finding
complementary results for seventeen European countries).
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which this impact occurs, rather than on the direct effect of debt on
growth, in order to better understand the conditions under which a
country's economic growth rate is adversely impacted by higher debt
burdens.
III. WHAT ARE THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF SOVEREIGN DEFAULT?

The previous section reviewed evidence on whether increases in
sovereign debt-to-GDP ratios lead to lower economic growth. However,
what happens to a country's economy when its debt rises to the level
that triggers a default episode? An understanding of the implications of
default episodes can provide additional insight into the motivations for
fiscal consolidations, or "austerity" measures.
Before estimating the economic effects of default, one must first
95
decide on the definition of what constitutes a sovereign default.
Defined narrowly, default occurs when the sovereign borrower breaks
the terms of the debt contract. Defined broadly, default occurs whenever
the borrower either breaks the terms of the contract, or requires new
terms that are less favorable to the borrower. 96 Because researchers also
group country defaults into episodes on the basis of these definitions,
the definitions used will affect the measurement of both the number and
97
the duration of default episodes.
Once defaults have been defined, the next task is to estimate the
economic effects of these defaults. One way to measure the economic
impact of default is to examine an economy's economic growth rate
following episodes of default. Borensztein and Panizza conducted such a
study, testing the relationship between growth and default in eightythree countries between 1972 and 2000.98 Their results showed that
sovereign default was associated with a 1.2 percentage point decrease in
growth, with the impact of the default being concentrated in the first
year of the default. 99 However, as in the debt-growth empirical
literature, this result could reflect an endogeneity bias if there is
bidirectional causality between default and economic growth such that
low growth also leads to sovereign debt repayment problems. It is also

95. See Michael Tomz & Mark L. J. Wright, Empirical Research on Sovereign Debt and
Default 13 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18855, 2013).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 13-14 (noting their default definition implied a continuous default period for
Mexico between 1982 and 2000). But cf. Eduardo Borensztein & Ugo Panizza, The Costs of
Sovereign Debt, 57 INT'L MONETARY FUND STAFF PAPERS 683, 683 (2009) (identifying four
separate default episodes).
98. See Borensztein & Panizza, supra note 97.
99. Id. at 693.
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possible that the observed correlation between defaults and economic
growth actually reflects third factors that impact both default and
growth, such as a banking or currency crisis or a shock to the country's
terms of trade, all of which can lead to repayment problems and lower
economic growth. 100 As a result, it is necessary to look beyond the simple
default-growth correlation to understand the factors that are likely to be
the source of the loss in economic growth following a sovereign default.
One obvious possible economic cost of default is the disruption in
capital market access and increases in the cost of borrowing. 1 1 Evidence
has shown such disruptions do occur, though the extent and length of
the disruption to capital market access has varied across country
episodes and the associated time period. 0 2 For example, by defining
market access to include access to the bond or syndicated bank loan
market, joint authors Gelos, Sahay, and Sandlersis found that being in
default negatively impacts market access to credit, and that the average
country took 4.7 years during the period from 1980 through 2000 to
regain market access following default. 10 3 However, the length of the
exclusionary time falls in half when considering only the latter post1990 sample. 10 4 Joint authors Borensztein and Panizza, after controlling
for economic conditions such as per capita income, GDP growth,
inflation, and fiscal and external balances, also found that episodes of
default tended to be associated with both a decrease in the country's
credit rating and an increase in the borrowing costs, but that the
increases were concentrated in the year of and following default. 105 Joint
authors Cole and Kehoe, however, suggested that the reputational
impacts of default extended beyond the sovereign debt market.1 06 They
developed a model in which the reputational costs of default have
spillover effects that extend to areas such as private foreign investment,
107
as well as military, environmental, and economic alliances.
100. Id. at 693-694.
101. Jonathan Eaton & Mark Gersovitz, Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical
and EmpiricalAnalysis, 48 REV. ECON. STuD. 289, 304 (1981) (acting as the first to model
the impact of reputation costs and to examine some of the empirical economic impacts).
102. See Tomz & Wright, supra note 95, at 18, for a discussion of studies measuring
access to capital markets following a default. As the authors note, measuring such impacts
is complicated by two world wars, which also disrupted access to capital markets.
103. See R. Gaston Gelos et al., Sovereign Borrowing by Developing Countries: What
DeterminesMarket Access?, 83 J. INT'L ECON. 243, 250 (2011).
104. Id. at 249. However, the authors note that this latter number could be biased
downwards because they consider only countries that regained access, and some countries
that had defaulted within that time period had not regained market access.
105. Borensztein & Panizza, supra note 97, at 701.
106. See Harold L. Cole & Patrick J. Kehoe, Models of Sovereign Debt: Partial Versus
General Reputations, 39 INT'L ECON. REV. 55, 55 (1998).
107. Id. at 69.
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Default can also decrease income if it leads to restrictions on the
ability to engage in or finance international trade.108 Rose in his 2005
study examined the impact of sovereign debt renegotiations under Paris
Club agreements and found an economically and statistically significant
decrease in trade occurred. 10 9 Borenzstein and Panizza's 2009 study also
provided evidence that defaults were associated with a significantly
negative impact of debt on trade credit, but that the effect was limited
to the first or second year following default. 1 0 They found that after
controlling for trade credit, default was associated with a large and
statistically significant decrease in bilateral trade flows."' Zymek in his
2012 article provided further support for the adverse impact of default
on trade. His paper examined a panel of developed and developing
countries and found for both groups a stronger adverse impact of
sovereign default on the exports of sectors more dependent on external
12
financing."
Sovereign defaults can also adversely impact an economy due to the
effects of such defaults on a country's banking system. 113 In particular,
domestic banks that hold sovereign debt as assets will see a sharp
decrease in the value of their assets in the case of a sovereign default,
and this fall in assets will in turn lead to a decrease in bank lending and
an increase in the insolvency risk of the bank."14 Joint authors
Borenzstein and Panizza tested the impact of default and found that a
sovereign default lead to an eleven percent increase in the conditional
over the unconditional probability of a banking crisis. 1 5 Other studies
provided some additional insights and evidence on the links between

108. See Jeremy Bulow & Kenneth Rogoff, Sovereign Debt: Is to Forgive to Forget?, 79
AM. ECON. REV. 43, 43 (1989), who motivate their model by discussing this potential cost.
109. See Andrew K. Rose, One Reason Countries Pay Their Debts: Renegotiation and
InternationalTrade, 77 J. DEV. ECON. 189, 205 (2005). The 'Paris Club' is a group of 20
developed countries whose role is to "find coordinated and sustainable solutions to the
experienced
by debtor
countries."
CLUB DE
PARIS,
payment
difficulties
http://www.clubdeparis.orglen (last visited Apr. 27, 2015).
110. See Borensztein & Panizza, supra note 97, at 710.
111. Id. at 711.
112. See Robert Zymek, Sovereign Default, InternationalLending and Trade, 60 IMF
ECON. REV. 365, 378 (2012). But see, e.g., Jose Vicente Martinez & Guido Sandleris, Is it
Punishment? Sovereign Defaults and the Decline in Trade, 30 J. INT'L MONEY AND FIN. 909
(2011) (finding that the effect of the decrease in trade, and subsequent sovereign defaults,
does not lead to a larger decline in bilateral trade with creditor countries affected by the
default).
113. See generally REINHART & ROGOFF, SUPRA NOTE 28 (discussing episodes of banking
crises and sovereign default).
114. Borensztein & Panizza, supra note 97, at 713.
115. Id. at 713.
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sovereign defaults and banking crises. 116 Brutti's 2011 study showed
that when banks hold government bonds to boost their liquidity, a
sovereign default can trigger a liquidity crisis that then hurts the
domestic banking system and the economy. 117 In line with Brutti's
prediction, the empirical results showed that firms with greater
dependence on external finance experience sharper contractions
following a sovereign default. 118
Joint authors Gennaioli, Martin, and Rossi also modeled the links
between the banking sector and sovereign debt. They showed that
banks' desire to hold public bonds as assets to back up loans and
investments implied that a sovereign default has adverse consequences
for the banking sector. 119 Examining 101 examples of sovereign defaults,
they found that sixty-seven percent were associated with banking crises
120
and a sharp fall in private credit.
Finally, recent research has shed light on the linkages between
sovereign and corporate default. 121 Joint authors Das, Papaioannou, and
Trebesch examined how sovereign default risk can impact a private
firm's access to capital. 122 Bai and Wei's 2012 study also found that
sovereign risk, as measured by credit default swap (CDS) spreads in
thirty countries, increased corporate CDS spreads. 123 Hence, sovereign
default risk appears to have a wider impact on a country's economy

116. See, e.g., Filippo Brutti, Sovereign Defaults and Liquidity Crises, 84 J. INT'L ECON.
65 (2011); Nicola Gennaioli et al., Sovereign Default, Domestic Banks, and Financial
Institutions, 69 J. FINANCE 819 (2014).
117. Brutti, supranote 116, at 65-66.
118. See id. at 70.
119. Gennaioli et. al, supranote 116, at 821.
120. See id. at 842; see also Ricardo Correa & Horacio Sapriza, Sovereign Debt Crises
(Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Int'l Fin. Discussion Paper No. 1104, 2014),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/ifdp/2014/index.htm
(discussing
the sovereign debt-banking crisis channel).
121. See, e.g., Udaibir S. Das et al., Sovereign Default Risk and Private Sector Access to
Capital in Emerging Markets (IMF Working Paper No.10/10, 2010), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/wpl-sp.aspx?s-year=2010&e-year=2010&brtype=def
ault; Jennie Bai & Shang-Jin Wei, When is There a Strong Transfer Risk from the
Sovereigns to the Corporates?PropertyRights Gaps and CDS Spreads (Fed. Reserve Bank
of N.Y. Staff Report No. 579, 2012), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/
staff reports/sr579.html.
122. Das et al., supra note 121, at 27 (summarizing their findings that sovereign
defaults negatively impact corporate borrowing in emerging economies over the 19802004 period, and that increases in perceived sovereign risk reduces corporate borrowing
over the more recent 1993-2007 period).
123. Bai & Wei supra note 121, at 4 (noting that after controlling for other influences, a
100 basis point increase in a country's sovereign credit default swap (CDS) spread leads to
an average 71 basis point increase in corporate CDS spreads, with the transfer effect
being stronger in firms with state ownership).
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through its impact on the risk and costs of borrowing by firms in the
economy.
CONCLUSION
The use of fiscal "austerity" measures has sparked an active debate
about the needs for such measures. An important motivation for these
policies has been a concern regarding the longer-run economic impacts
of the growth and levels of sovereign debt. This article reviews some of
the recent evidence on the link between sovereign debt and economic
growth. The results of this article's survey suggest that, while the bulk
of the evidence demonstrates a negative relationship between debt and
economic growth, the evidence is nevertheless mixed on whether higher
debt burdens are the cause of lower growth, whether there exists a welldefined threshold debt-to-GDP level effect, and which economic factors
may ultimately be behind the negative impact of higher debt burdens on
economic growth. The empirical results are also sensitive to the
countries and the time period examined, and to the empirical methods
employed. The evidence of negative economic impacts of sovereign
default episodes is stronger, though the magnitudes of the effects also
depend on the sample and time period.
As noted by Panizza and Presbitero's 2013 study, however, "saying
that there is no evidence that debt is bad for growth is different from
24
saying that there is evidence that debt does not matter for growth."'
Many theoretical models suggest reasons why debt beyond a certain
level may hinder economic growth or lead to higher inflation, and
prudent policy makers should take into account these possible impacts
in their decision-making processes. The challenge to future empirical
research is to better understand the mechanisms through which debt
impacts growth, and to identify the conditions under which these
mechanisms are likely to be operative. Additional cross-country
research based on similar measures of debt, taking into account the
different economic structures and stages of financial development (as
well as endogeneity issues) is therefore needed to deepen our
understanding of the economic effects of sovereign debt burdens.

124. Panizza & Presbitero, supra note 10, at 198.
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Figure 1: Public debt as a percent of GDP, advanced
economies vs. emerging and developing countries, 1880-2012125
Public Debt as %GDP
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Source: IMF Data Mapper: Historical Public Debt Database, INT'L MONETARY FUND,
http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/index.php?db=DEBT.

125. Values are medians of nominal GDP-weighted Gross Government Debt as a
percentage of GDP.
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Figure 2: Overall fiscal balance as a percent of GDP, 20082015126
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Source: IMF, Fiscal Monitor: Back to Work-How Fiscal Policy Can Help, at Table 1.1a
(Oct. 2014), availableat http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fm/2014/02/pdflfml402.pdf.

126. The 'P' for years 2014 and 2015 refers to 'projection'. For the list of countries
designated as 'Advanced Economies' and as 'Emerging Market and Middle Income
Countries", see Fiscal Monitor, supra note 6, at 60.
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Figure 3: Gross general government debt as percent of GDP,
2008-2015127
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Source: IMF, Fiscal Monitor: Back to Work-How Fiscal Policy Can Help, at Table 1.2
(Oct. 2014), available at http://www.imf.org/external/ pubs/ft/fm/2014/02/pdf/fml4O2.pdf.

127. Id.
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Figure 4: Gross government debt as percent of GDP
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Source: IMF Data Mapper: Historical Public Debt Database, INT'L MONETARY FUND,
http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/index.php?db=DEBT;

IMF, Fiscal Monitor: Back
to Work-How Fiscal Policy Can Help, at Table 1.2 (Oct. 2014), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fni/2014/02/pdf/fml402.pdf.

